Alert

BIS Issues Interim Final Rule on Remote Access to Supercomputing Capabilities

November 19, 2026

On November 16, 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued the long-awaited interim final rule (IFR) adding new export controls on advanced computing items, including advanced semiconductors and certain foreign data center activities involving remote access to computing power. The rule follows concerns about foreign adversaries running workloads on chips located in other countries, including through rented cloud infrastructure. The IFR additionally formalizes the rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule, following BIS’s guidance that it would not be enforced in May 2025. Companies operating along global semiconductor and artificial intelligence supply chains, particularly data center operators, exporters of advanced computing components, and semiconductor fabricators, should review and update their export compliance procedures to account for the IFR’s new and revised requirements. The IFR takes effect upon publication in the Federal Register, although some affected stakeholders have 90 days to comply with certain of the new requirements. Comments on revisions to the rule are due within 60 days of publication.

Background

According to its press release, BIS, at the direction of the Department of the Treasury and the National Security Council, issued this IFR to “align[] protections governing remote access to advanced computing capabilities with existing controls on the physical shipment” of such technology. The IFR amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. Parts 730-774, which in relevant part restrict certain countries and entities from obtaining advanced semiconductors and other technologies that support supercomputing and advanced computing capabilities. This IFR builds on this framework by targeting the use of third-country data centers to bypass export controls on advanced U.S. semiconductors.

In January 2009, BIS issued an advisory opinion concluding that providing computational capacity through grid or cloud computing is not subject to the EAR, and BIS reaffirmed this prior position in 2014. Therefore, prior to this IFR, U.S. export controls did not bar data centers from providing remote access to jurisdictions where exporting the underlying items would require a license. More generally, although BIS’s interpretation of “export” has long included physically shipping or transferring hardware and software object code or source code outside of the U.S., along with making software available for download outside the U.S., BIS has historically taken the position, including through multiple advisory opinions, that no “export” occurred when a company hosted commercial or dual-use software on a U.S. server and allowed non-U.S. persons to access such software remotely, so long as those persons could not download the software and did not otherwise receive any code, a software license key, or controlled technology. The IFR does not, on its face, entirely upend BIS’s prior position but materially narrows the scope of the carve-out.

Key details of the IFR are highlighted below.

New End-Use Licensing Requirement for Data Centers

The IFR establishes new end-use controls requiring a license for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of advanced computing items if a party has “knowledge” that the advanced computing items will be used in a data center that will provide significant volumes of computing power (greater than 12,000,000 aggregate total processing performance (TPP)) to an entity headquartered, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered, in Macau or a country specified in Country Group D:5 in supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR. Specific Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) covered include 3A001.z; 3A090 (except 3A090.c); 3D001 and 3E001 (to the extent related to 3A001.z or 3A090, except 3A090.c); 4A003.z; 4A004.z; 4A005.z; 4A090; 4D001, 4D090, and 4E001 (to the extent related to the foregoing 4A items); 5A002.z; 5A004.z; 5A992.z; 5D002.z; 5D992.z; and 5E002 and 5E992 (to the extent related to the foregoing 5A and 5D items).

The IFR clarifies that this prohibition and the noted TPP threshold extends to both individual and “linked” data centers, i.e., centers that use “networking infrastructure” to connect multiple data centers’ “physical and virtual facilities to share resources, balance workloads, and replicate data as a unified whole.” As such, operators cannot evade the restriction by splitting computer capacity across multiple sites. Nor can operators or other reexporters or transferors rely on the EAR’s de minimis exceptions for U.S.-origin items incorporated or commingled with foreign-made items to avoid coverage under this new prohibition.

To satisfy the “knowledge” requirement, exporters, reexporters, and transferors of covered items will be expected to obtain and be able to provide sufficient information from the foreign data center regarding that data center’s “know your customer” due diligence checks. The IFR states that verification of a data center’s due diligence processes should include validation that the data center conducts diligence on whether customers are subject to direct or indirect ownership or control by persons located in, headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered in, Macau or a D:5 country (e.g., China). The IFR further notes that where a foreign data center declines to or is unable to provide information sufficient to verify compliance with this end-use control, this will be considered a “red flag” that presumptively provides an exporter, reexporter, or transferor with “knowledge,” unless they can resolve that red flag before proceeding with the transaction.

Existing data centers providing these services have 90 days from the effective date of the IFR to obtain a license. Importantly, this IFR also imposes a continuing monitoring obligation: if a party later learns that an overseas data center begins providing significant computing power to a prohibited entity, this change in end-use is considered a “transfer (in-country)” and may trigger a notification and authorization requirement.

The prohibition includes a limited exception if computing access is used exclusively for a “commercial recommender system,” an exception covering systems that are solely designed to “rank, filter, or suggest commercial products, services, or content to users based on user behavior, transaction history, or item attributes.” Use of this exception requires reporting to BIS.

New Destination-Based Licensing Requirements to Prevent Rule Circumvention

The IFR adds a licensing requirement for exports of advanced computing items covered by ECCNs 3A090, 4A090, and corresponding “.z” paragraphs in other ECCNs in Commerce Control List (CCL) Categories 3, 4, and 5 to destinations identified as posing “an unacceptable risk of diversion.” These destinations are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brazil, and any additional countries the Secretary of Commerce later designates to present a high risk of diversion. BIS notes that it is pursuing additional consequences for countries and entities that evade the IFR, including additional import and licensing restrictions, downgraded status within the export control regime, and potential placement on the U.S. Entity List.

The new destination-based licensing requirement does not apply to exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) if the ultimate consignee or end-user is headquartered in—or has an ultimate parent company headquartered in—the United States, provided that the exporter, reexporter, or transferor of items complies with reporting obligations to BIS regarding the items, TPP, parties involved, and destination.

Raising Obligations for Chip Fabricators

Additionally, the IFR clarifies that license requirements continue for “front-end fabricators” and outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT) companies that create integrated circuits. Previously, BIS determined that these parties were assumed to be producing items for data centers, but this presumption could be overcome if the export was to an “Approved” or “Authorized” designer; if the item was packaged by a front-end fabricator outside Macau or a destination in Country Group D:5, and the fabricator verified the circuit’s transistor count; or if the chip was packaged by an “Approved” outsourced OSAT company that verified the transistor count. The IFR limits the ability to overcome this presumption. Specifically, integrated circuit designers who are, or have a parent company, located in a destination specified in Country Groups D:1, D:4, or D:5 of supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR who are not “Authorized” or “Approved” cannot take advantage of the above exceptions.

Rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule

The IFR also formally rescinds BIS’s January 2025 “Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion,” known as the “AI Diffusion Rule.” As discussed here, in May 2025, BIS announced the rescission of the rule, which had never been enforced. The AI Diffusion Rule created or expanded controls for advanced closed-weight AI models and computing technology, along with creating a new authorization process for building data centers abroad. The IFR formally revokes the controls on model weights established by the AI Diffusion Rule, as well as the worldwide Regional Stability (RS) licensing regime created by the rule. It also removes License Exceptions Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA) and Low Processing Performance (LPP), both established by the AI Diffusion Rule, and the Data Center Validated End User Authorization, which was established by an October 2024 rulemaking and subsequently modified by the AI Diffusion Rule.

The IFR nonetheless retains License Exception Advanced Compute Manufacturing (ACM) under section 740.28 of the EAR, which authorizes certain exports, reexports, and transfers of eligible advanced computing items to qualifying private sector end users outside Macau and Country Group D:5 for development, production, or storage. The IFR also retains the current version of the advanced computing foreign direct product rule in section 734.9(h) of the EAR, which preserves BIS jurisdiction over certain covered advanced computing items that have been incorporated into foreign-produced equipment. Additionally, the IFR makes revisions to the advanced computing items end-use control in section 744.23 of the EAR to ensure that a license will continue to be required for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of advanced computing items when such items are destined for entities headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, Country Group D:5 or Macau.

Potential Additional Implications

Notably, the IFR also expands use of BIS’s “is informed” process, whereby BIS may issue correspondence to specific parties that a license is required for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of specified items to certain persons or destinations, because there is an unacceptable risk of use in, or diversion to, the prohibited data center end-uses and end-users described in the IFR.

We also note that the IFR addresses similar concerns identified in H.R. 2683, the Remote Access Security Act (RASA), which passed the House in January 2026. RASA would amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to create a new definition of “remote access” for BIS to regulate items under the EAR. If the IFR goes into effect and RASA is passed, it remains to be seen how they will be reconciled and whether RASA could provide authority to further expand the controls provided for in the IFR.

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Our National Security, International Trade, and Strategic Competition & Supply Chain teams have unparalleled experience and expertise representing a broad range of U.S. and multinational clients in complex export control, sanctions, international trade, and supply chain matters. For more information on this new rule and any other national security, trade, or supply chain issues, please contact any of the attorneys listed on this alert.

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