Trump Issues IEEPA Executive Order Addressing Risks of Foreign-Produced Bulk-Power Equipment
On August 26, 2026, President Trump signed Executive Order (EO) 14420 – Declaring a National Emergency to Secure the United States Bulk-Power System (“Bulk-Power EO”) – invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to safeguard the U.S. bulk-power system from vulnerabilities created by certain components and systems manufactured by foreign parties. The bulk-power system is critical infrastructure comprised of power plants, high-voltage transmission lines, and other systems for operating the interconnected electrical grid. The Bulk-Power EO follows on growing concerns regarding the security of the system from interference by malign foreign actors. President Trump signed a similar Executive Order during his first term (EO 13920), but President Biden paused and then rescinded the order in 2021.
The Bulk-Power EO restores and expands the scope of potentially banned transactions and covered equipment. The implementation of the EO is delegated to the Secretary of Energy, who is tasked with identifying prohibited transactions. Alongside the forward-looking ban, the EO provides the Secretary of Energy the authority to impose conditions on the use and operation of certain equipment already in use at U.S. bulk-power systems. The order also directs the Secretary of Energy to develop a list of equipment that poses risks to the bulk-power grid and deliver recommendations to the President on how best to address those risks.
Like the predecessor EO 13920, the newly signed Bulk-Power EO targets certain transactions that involve the acquisition, importation, transfer, or installation of bulk-power system equipment “designed, developed, manufactured or supplied” by certain identified entities. Also similar to EO 13920, the new EO grants the Secretary of Energy authority to prohibit those covered transactions that are determined to pose an undue risk of threatening certain aspects of the bulk-power system, pose an undue risk of catastrophic effects on security or resilience of the U.S. critical infrastructure or the economy, or otherwise pose an unacceptable national security risk.
Scope of Covered Transactions
The Bulk-Power EO expands the scope of transactions originally identified in EO 13920, which was limited to transactions involving “acquisition, importation, transfer, or installation of any bulk-power system electric equipment.” The new EO’s scope includes those transactions and adds transactions involving “any critical component, software, firmware, digital service, maintenance service, or remote-access capability” for bulk-power system equipment supplied by identified entities.
Definition of Bulk-Power System Electrical Equipment
The Bulk-Power EO broadens the definition of “bulk power system electrical equipment” initially covered by EO 13920, now explicitly covering items used in substations, control rooms, or power generating stations, including reactors; capacitors; substation transformers; utility-scale and other grid-connected inverters; battery energy storage systems; and uninterruptible power supply systems supporting critical infrastructure, current coupling capacitors, large generators, small generators, backup generators, substation voltage regulators, shunt capacitor equipment, automatic circuit reclosers, instrument transformers, coupling capacity voltage transformers, protective relaying, metering equipment, high voltage circuit breakers, generation turbines, industrial control systems (including remote terminal units, programmable logic controllers, and intelligent electronic devices), distributed control systems, and safety instrumented systems.
Covered Foreign Entity
The Bulk-Power EO also expands upon EO 13920’s set of potential targeted entities that qualify as a “Covered Foreign Entity,” which covers parties owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of (1) a government of a foreign country that is subject to a United States arms embargo or sanctions regime, under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (listed in 22 C.F.R. 126.1) (currently listing a range of countries including, but not limited to, China, Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela), or (2) a party that the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of War, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, has determined is engaged in conduct that is detrimental to the national security or foreign policy of the United States.
Promotion of Federal Procurement Policies to Support National Security
The Bulk-Power EO requires the Secretary of Energy to issue a set of recommended revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to ensure that national security risks are adequately considered in any federal procurement concerning energy infrastructure and to prioritize the acquisition of United States-manufactured energy infrastructure, and directs the FAR Council to consider proposing amendments to the FAR to implement the recommendations provided by the Secretary.
Implementation
Of particular note, the Bulk-Power EO authorizes the issuance (within 120 days of the EO) of rules and regulations that determine that particular countries or persons are Covered Foreign Entities; identify persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a Covered Foreign Entity under the order; identify particular equipment or countries with respect to which transactions involving bulk-power system electric equipment warrant particular scrutiny; and establish procedures to license transactions otherwise prohibited by the order.
The Secretary is also authorized to negotiate measures to mitigate concerns regarding transactions covered by the order and establish criteria and procedures for recognizing particular equipment and vendors as pre-qualified for transactions, exempting them from coverage of the Bulk-Power EO, and can publish a list of those pre-qualified equipment and vendors.
Relationship with Broader Efforts to Secure Critical Infrastructure Supply Chains
The Bulk-Power EO is consistent with the Trump Administration’s broader effort to reduce national security risks arising from foreign-made equipment that could enable sabotage, unauthorized access, or supply disruptions in a range of sensitive sectors, including telecommunications, energy, artificial intelligence, and other critical infrastructure. By invoking emergency authorities to limit certain foreign-produced grid equipment and associated software and services, the EO reflects the Administration’s wider strategy of strengthening infrastructure resilience, promoting trusted domestic supply chains, and protecting systems considered essential to national defense, economic security, and the operation of critical services. The EO does appear to share some similarities with the Information and Communication Technology and Services (ICTS) program administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce, and thus could potentially be implemented in a similar manner.
Wiley’s National Security, International Trade, and Strategic Competition & Supply Chain practitioners have substantial experience helping companies navigate government supply chain security regulations and policies. For more information about the actions discussed in this alert, please contact one of the authors.
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