Supreme Court Strikes Down Political-Party Coordinated Expenditure Limits

July 1, 2026

In a much-anticipated decision, the U.S. Supreme Court on June 30 held in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission (NRSC) that political parties may make unlimited party coordinated expenditures on behalf of their candidates. This landmark opinion is a significant First Amendment victory for political parties and candidates.

The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) authorizes national and state party committees to make a limited amount of party coordinated expenditures (i.e., campaign spending in coordination with candidates) on behalf of the parties’ nominees for federal office. Party coordinated expenditures do not count against a political party’s contribution limit for the benefiting federal candidate. Instead, FECA provides a different limit for party coordinated expenditures that varies by office sought and state. The National Republican Senatorial Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, and two federal candidates challenged the constitutionality of these provisions, arguing that the party coordinated expenditure limits “stand in serious tension” with current First Amendment jurisprudence because the limits do not prevent quid pro quo corruption (or its appearance) and severely infringe on the rights of political parties to campaign with their own candidates. 

The Supreme Court agreed. Specifically, it held that “FECA’s limits on political parties’ coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment,”[1] overruling Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Campaign Committee (Colorado II).[2] At the outset, the Court acknowledged “the important and traditional role of political parties during campaigns”[3] and how “it is ‘natural for a party and its candidate to work together and consult with one another during the course of the election.’”[4] It viewed the party coordinated expenditure limits as severe restrictions that “inflict[ed] a ‘stifling effect on the ability of the party to do what it exists to do.’”[5] The Court explained that “Colorado II’s reasoning has been rejected by subsequent cases and is no longer good law in light of the Court’s more recent precedents.”[6] Under current First Amendment doctrine, “[t]he Court now recognizes ‘only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing [quid pro quo] corruption or the appearance of [quid pro quo] corruption.’”[7] The Court concluded that the party coordinated expenditure limits, which Colorado II upheld based on “the Government’s desire to prevent or reduce influence, ingratiation, gratitude, access, or the like for those who spend in support of, or contribute to, political parties or candidates,” “can no longer be justified on that basis.”[8] The Court also found they could not be upheld on an anticircumvention rationale, because “other less-speech-restrictive tools” – such as earmarking and disclosure law – were “available to the Government to prevent circumvention.”

While the NRSC decision vindicates the First Amendment rights of political parties and candidates, it is important to note what today’s decision does not do:

• The opinion does not alter limits on contributions from individuals and political action committees (PACs) to national political parties, state political parties, and federal candidates.
• The Court expressly did not address the statutory limits applicable to coordinated expenditures by outside groups, so existing outside-group coordination rules were not altered by this decision. Outside groups, such as independent expenditure-only political committees (i.e., super PACs) and politically active 501(c) organizations, continue to be prohibited from coordinating their spending with federal candidates and political parties.
• FECA’s earmarking rules remain in place. If a donor’s contribution to a national or state political party is “in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit” to a federal candidate,[9] the funds become a contribution from the donor to the candidate subject to applicable limits.
• FECA’s disclosure requirements remain in place.
• The opinion specifically addresses FECA’s federal party coordinated-expenditure caps. Whether analogous state-law limits are vulnerable after NRSC will depend on the text, structure, and litigation posture of the particular state law.

Wiley authored an amicus brief in support of the prevailing Petitioners.

Wiley’s Election Law & Government Ethics Practice is available to provide additional guidance on the NRSC decision and its implications. For more information on these issues, please contact the attorneys listed on this alert.  

[1] Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, No. 24–621, 2026 WL 1868932, at *3 (U.S. June 30, 2026).

[2] 533 U.S. 431 (2001). 

[3] NRSC, 2026 WL 1868932 at *7.

[4] Id. (citing Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 469 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).

[5] Id. at *8 (citing Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 630 (1996)).

[6] Id. at *26.

[7] Id. at *12 (citing McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 206–207 (2014)).

[8] Id. at *13.

[9] 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8).